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Product Liability-Cigarettes and Cipollone: What's Left?
What's Gone?
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Law ought to make sense. When it does, it is nice for lawyers, who
are in the business of trying cases, and judges, who are in the business
of deciding them. Sensible law makes everyone's job easier, and it also
allows decision makers to focus on primarily factual issues and resolve
the concrete disputes before them. Alternatively, given the competing
factors and interests involved, one may believe law really never can
make total sense. It is, in this view, impossible to explain law as based
on economic efficiency, shared morality, or any other grand notion of
how a society ought to structure itself. In a world as diverse as ours,
in a nation as heterogeneous as ours, one should not be surprised to
find that legal doctrine is often in hopeless, almost nonsensical disarray.
As such, the most the commentator can do is attempt to interpret what
"law" we have and to provide some light (however dim) to the bench
and bar. It is in this latter vein that I write this piece.
On June 24, 1992, the United States Supreme Court issued its long
awaited decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.' In Cipollone, the
Court considered the extent to which the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act of 1965 ("1965 Act") 2 and the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969 ("1969 Act") 3 preempted state tort law claims
against cigarette manufacturers. In deciding the case, members of the
Court issued three separate opinions. No majority of justices joined in
any one opinion. As such, we are left doing some guessing about what
is and what is not a permissible state tort law claim against a cigarette
manufacturer although one opinion, the plurality written by Justice
Stevens, will, no doubt, receive the most attention.

Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center. Short portions of this
piece have previously appeared in the author's column, "Let's Talk Torts," in the Louisiana
Trial Lawyers' Association Newsletter, "The Trial Brief."
1. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992). Interestingly, the case has now been voluntarily dismissed.
See (DC N.J., No. 83-2864, dismissed 11/5/92).
2. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13311340 (1988)).
3. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13311340 (1988)).
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What I propose to do herein is explain the three opinions. After
explaining the opinions in Part II, I will examine, in Part III, the
confusing state of the law in which the plurality opinion leaves us. I
will do so primarily by employing a hypothetical which reveals the
potentially inconsistent results that could arise under the plurality opinion. In Part IV, I will examine what effect Cipollone may have on a
Louisiana plaintiff suing for injuries suffered as a result of cigarette
smoking. Finally, in Part V, I will draw some brief conclusions.
II.
A.

THE CASE

Background

As noted, the Cipollone Court produced three opinions. Four justices
signed one, three justices signed another, and two signed the third. Four
of the justices found that the 1965 Act did not preempt any tort claims
but that the 1969 Act preempted some of the plaintiffs' state tort law
claims. Three justices felt that neither the 1965 nor the 1969 Act preempted any tort claims whatsoever. Two other justices believed that the
1965 Act preempted some claims and the 1969 Act preempted even more
claims than the first group of four found preempted. As such, given
the way the court split, the opinion of the group of four constitutes,
in essence, the "law" of the land. In this section, I will spend most
of my time discussing this plurality opinion, although it is important
to first set forth (briefly) the facts and claims at issue in the lawsuit.
Rose DeFrancesco Cipollone began smoking in 1942, when she was
sixteen. She died in 1984 of lung cancer caused by her smoking. The
year before her death, she and her husband, Antonio, sued the three
manufacturers of the cigarettes she had smoked: Liggett Group, Inc.,
Phillip Morris, Inc., and Lorillard. When her husband also died, their
son, Thomas, continued the suit. The suit was basically a survival and
wrongful death action under New Jersey tort law. 4 In the suit, the
Cipollones set forth five broad claims against the defendants alleging
design defects, failure to warn, breach of express warranty, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and a conspiracy to defraud.
In their design defect claims, the Cipollones claimed that the cigarettes Rose had smoked were unreasonably dangerous in design because
the defendants did not use a safer alternative design and because the
social value of the cigarettes was outweighed by their danger. Specifically,
as to the alternative design claim, plaintiffs alleged defendants should
have marketed and sold a palladium cigarette which would have been

4.

Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2614 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
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safer.' In their failure to warn claims, the Cipollones alleged that the
defendants failed to provide an adequate warning about cigarettes and
that the defendants were negligent in the way that they tested, researched,
sold, promoted, and advertised the cigarettes involved. 6 As for the express
warranty claims, the Cipollones alleged that the defendants had expressly
warranted that their cigarettes did not present any significant health
consequences. The Cipollones also claimed that the defendants had willfully, through advertising, attempted to neutralize the federally mandated
warnings and that the defendants had possessed, but failed to act upon,
medical and scientific data which indicated cigarettes were hazardous to
health. Finally, the Cipollones claimed that the defendant manufacturers
had conspired to deprive the public of the data which they possessed.
The defendants argued that a number of the Cipollones' claims were
preempted by the relevent federal legislation.
Initially, the district court found that none of the Cipollones' claims
were preempted. 7 However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded the case.' On remand, the district court concluded that
all of the Cipollones' post-1965 claims, except the design claims, were
preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of
1965 and the later enacted Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969. 9 On the merits the district court held that the design, risk/utility
claims were barred under a New Jersey statute, which applied to pending
cases. The statute basically enacted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A
comment (i) as the law of New Jersey. 10 As to the alternative safer
design claim based on the palladium cigarette the district court directed
a verdict for the defendants. The court reasoned that it would be sheer
speculation for the jury to conclude that Rose Cipollone would have
tried and switched to the palladium cigarette and that, even had she
done so, the switch would have realistically reduced her risk of getting
cancer." The court did conclude, however, that Cipollone could pursue

5. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1493 (D.N.J. 1988).
6. The Cipollones also filed a general negligence claim alleging a failure to research
and test, but the district court granted a directed verdict on that claim reasoning that
this alleged failure did not harm Mrs. Cipollone in any independent fashion. Id. at 1499.
7. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1170-71 (D.N.J. 1984),
rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987).
8. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1043, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987).
9. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986).
10. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., [1987-1989 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) 111,637 (D.N.J. 1987) (referring to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt.

1 (1965)).
11. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1493-95 (D.N.J. 1988)
(reducing the risk of cancer by 8% to 17% does not establish proximate cause).
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warning claims insofar as those claims arose before the effective date
of the 1965 statute, January 1, 1966.
The jury that eventually heard the case rejected the Cipollones' pre1966 fraud and conspiracy claims but found Ligget had breached its
pre-1966 duty to warn and its express warranties. Phillip Morris and
Lorillard's only exposure, after the earlier rulings, was on the conspiracy
and fraud claims, which the jury resolved against the Cipollones. The
jury awarded $400,000 in damages against Liggett on the warning and
warranty claims. However, damages for failure to warn were not recovered because the jury also found that Cipollone herself was eighty
percent at fault in voluntarily encountering a known risk. This finding
barred recovery on the tort claim under New Jersey law. However, the
damages for breach of express warranty were recoverable because in
New Jersey comparative fault is not a defense to a breach of warranty
2
claim.1
After another appeal to the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the preemption issue.' 3 As in any preemption case,
the starting point for the Court's consideration was the relevant federal
legislation.
B.

Legislation

Section 4 of the 1965 Act provided for the following warning to
be printed on every package of cigarettes: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking
May be Hazardous to Your Health."
Section 5(a) of the Act provided: "No statement relating to smoking
and health, other than the statement required by Section 4 of this Act,
shall be required on any cigarette package." Section 5(b) provided: "No
statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity
with the provisions of this Act." The Act had a sunset provision
providing that its effect would terminate on July 1, 1969.14 As the
termination date neared, activity by the Federal Trade Commission and
the Federal Communications Commission to further regulate smoking
increased. Consequently, Congress enacted the 1969 Act, which made
some changes in the 1965 Act-changes which the Cipollone plurality
deemed significant.
Specifically, the 1969 Act strengthened the required warning. It
provided that a warning label for cigarettes must state not that smoking

12. Cipollone Jury Awards $400,000 Against Liggett on Warranty Claim, 16 Prod.
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 565 (June 17, 1988).
13. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111
S. Ct. 1386 (1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
14. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965).
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"may be hazardous" but that it "is dangerous."' 5 Second, the 1969
Act banned advertising in any medium of electronic communication
which was subject to FCC jurisdiction. Third, and most significantly,
the 1969 Act changed section 5(b) to provide: "No requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State
law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this
Act."1' 6 It is this amended preemption provision which the Supreme
Court had before it in Cipollone.
Interestingly, in 1969, Congress did not amend section 2 of the Act
which set forth the law's policies, as follows:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this Act,
to establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship
between smoking and health whereby(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to
that effect on each package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected
to the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and
(B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette
labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health."
C.

The Plurality: Justice Stevens' Opinion

Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion in Cipollone for the group
of four, who joined his entire opinion. The four consisted of: Stevens,
Rehnquist, White and O'Connor. After setting forth the background of
the applicable legislation, Justice Stevens articulated certain general rules
concerning preemption. Stevens stated that where Congress included an
express provision dealing with preemption, like section 5(b), and that
provision provided a reliable indication of congressional intent with
respect to the relationship between the relevant state and federal law
then "'there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state
laws from the substantive provisions' of the legislation."'" Stevens said

15. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970). Subsequent amendments have required
a rotating series of warnings. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98474, 98 Stat. 2201 (1992) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (West Supp. 1992)).
16. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-

1340 (1988)).
17. Id.
18. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2618 (1992) (quoting California
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282, 107 S.Ct. 683, 694 (1987)).
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that where Congress has spoken on the preemption issue, "matters
beyond that reach are not preempted."' 9 Importantly, Stevens reasoned
that the express preemption clauses in Cipollone must be read against
the backdrop of the "presumption against the preemption of state police
power regulations. ' 20 This presumption against preemption and the accompanying exclusive effect accorded to express preemption clauses are
critical to the interpretation of the opinion. I am not a constitutional
law scholar and do not intend to interpret the opinions from a constitutional law perspective (nor to consider its effect, in this piece, on
other cases involving preemption issues); however, after summarizing
Justice Scalia's position on this point later, I will return to the possible
effect of this presumption on future tort claims involving cigarettes. Let
me now return specifically to Justice Stevens' plurality opinion.
Construing the 1965 version of section 5(b) in light of the articulated
general rules about preemption, the Court held that the 1965 statute
did not preempt any state law tort claims. 2' Justices Blackmun, Souter
and Kennedy actually joined in this portion of the opinion. Thus, as
to the 1965 Act, Stevens' opinion represents the opinion of the Court,
a majority opinion. All tort claims against manufacturers arising before
the effective date of the 1969 statute are, and will be, cognizable in
state court. They are not preempted. The Court, in reaching this conclusion, reasoned that the 1965 Act only prohibited state rulemaking
bodies from mandating statements in advertising which were somehow
at variance with, or in addition to, the statement set forth in section
22
4 of the 1965 Act.
Moving to the 1969 version of the Act, Stevens' opinion truly
becomes a plurality, for here Blackmun, Souter, and Kennedy leave
him. Interpreting the language of the 1969 Act, quoted above, Stevens,
and those who joined him, decided that the Act did, in fact, preempt
certain state tort claims. In reaching this conclusion, the plurality noted
that state tort damage actions may constitute "requirements or prohibitions" which are "imposed" by state law. In rejecting the Cipollones'
contention that the decisions of common law tort judges do not constitute
requirements or prohibitions imposed by state law, the plurality stated
that the contention was not only at odds with the plain words of the
1969 Act but "with the general understanding of common law damages
actions.' '23 The phrase 'no requirement or prohibition' sweeps broadly
and suggested no distinction between positive enactments and common

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2618.
at 2618-19.
at 2619.
at 2620 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
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law; to the contrary, those words easily encompassed obligations that
took the form of common law rules." 4 Further, the plurality noted
that the basis of a common law damage action is the existence of a
legal duty. Stevens cited Prosser and Keeton for this proposition.25 Justice
Stevens went on to state that "it is difficult to say that such actions
do not impose 'requirements or prohibitions."' 2 "[I]t is the essence of
the common law to enforce duties that are either affirmative requirements
'27
or negative prohibitions.
The plurality also rejected the argument that common law rules are
not "imposed" by state law. However, to the plurality, the 1969 Act
did not preempt all state tort law claims. Again, interpreting the appropriate language of the Act "in light of the strong presumption against
pre-emption,''28 Stevens stated that the
central inquiry in each case is straightforward: we ask whether
the legal duty that is the predicate of the common law damages
action constitutes a "requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health ... imposed under State law with respect to
... advertising or promotion," giving that clause a fair but
29
narrow reading.
The plurality then considered each of the Cipollones' claims under its
"central inquiry."
Stevens began with the failure to warn claims. As noted, the Cipollones had offered two theories concerning defendants' failure to warn.
First, the Cipollones had argued that the tobacco companies were "negligent in the manner that they tested, researched, sold, promoted, and
advertised their cigarettes." 30 Second, they contended that defendants
"failed to provide adequate warnings of the health consequences of
cigarette smoking."'" The Court reasoned that these latter failure to
warn claims were preempted "to the extent that they rely on a state
law 'requirement or prohibition .. .with respect to . . . advertising or
promotion."' 3 2 Both failure to warn theories were preempted after 1969
insofar as they required a showing that post-1969 advertising or promotions "should have included additional, or more clearly stated, warnings . . - Stevens pointed out, however, that the Act did not preempt

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27.

Id. (emphasis omitted).

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.at 2621.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 2621-22.
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the Cipollones' claims in so far as those claims relied "solely on respractices or other actions unrelated to
pondents' testing or research
'34
advertising or promotion.
Interestingly, the plurality found that the Cipollones' express warranty claims were not preempted. To reach this conclusion the Court
analyzed the nature of a warranty claim under Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) Section 2-313(l)(a).3" Stevens reasoned that liability for
breach of a warranty arises from the content of the relevant warranty.
Thus, the requirements that a warranty imposes do not arise from state
law but from the warrantor's statements and/or actions. Although the
general duty not to breach a warranty might arise from state law, the
particular duty in a particular case derives from the warrantor's, (here
manufacturers'), own statements. Importantly, the fact that warranties
may have been made in advertising or promotion did not alter the
plurality's no preemption conclusion.
Turning to the fraudulent misrepresentation claims, the plurality
reached contrary conclusions on the two types of fraudulent misrepresentation claims the Cipollones raised. First, the Cipollones alleged that
the defendants had fraudulently, through their advertising, neutralized
the effect of the required warning labels. Stevens reasoned that this
claim was based on "a state-law prohibition against statements in advertising and promotional materials that tend to minimize the health
hazards associated with smoking. 3' 6 Recognizing that such a rule would
be "merely the converse of a state law requirement that warnings be
included in advertising and promotional materials, ' 3 7 the Court found
this portion of the claim preempted. Additionally, the Cipollones claimed
fraud and misrepresentation by defendants' "'false representation of a
material fact [and by] conceal[ment of] a material fact."'38 The plurality
found that these claims were not preempted. Stevens noted that fraud
claims would not be preempted to the extent that they were based on
a duty to disclose information to entities, such as a state administrative
agency. Significantly, even those fraud claims associated with advertising

34. Id. at 2622.
35. The uniform version of U.C.C. § 2-313 (1)(a), which is codified in N.J. Stat.
Ann § 12A:2-313(l)(a) (West 1992), provides:
(1)Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation
or promise.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313(l)(a), IA U.L.A. 101 (1989).
36. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2623 (1992) (plurality opinion
of Stevens, J.).
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
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or promotion were not preempted because the predicate duty was not
"based on smoking and health" but rather on a more general
obligation-the duty not to deceive.
... Unlike state law obligations concerning the warning necessary to render a product "reasonably safe," state law proscriptions on intentional fraud rely on a single, uniform standard:
39
falsity.
Turning finally to the conspiracy to misrepresent or conceal material
facts, the plurality found that this claim was not preempted for the
reasons applicable to the fraud claims.
D.

Justice Blackmun's Opinion

Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter partially
concurred and partially dissented. As noted previously, Blackmun et al.
joined in the plurality's opinion dealing with the 1965 Act; they, too,
felt that the 1965 Act did not preempt any state law tort actions. But,
Blackmun, Souter, and Kennedy dissented from that portion of the
plurality opinion dealing with the 1969 Act. They felt the 1969 Act,
like the 1965 Act, had no preemptive effect on state tort actions.
Blackmun agreed with the plurality that the Court should not infer
preemption beyond that clearly mandated by Congress' language. He
also agreed that the preemptive scope of the acts at issue was governed
entirely by the express language of the statutes' preemption provisions.
He "further agree[d] with the Court that we cannot find the state
common-law damages claims at issue in this case pre-empted by federal
law in the absence of clear and unambiguous evidence that Congress
intended that result."' 4 Blackmun felt that this rule of interpretation
was as applicable in interpreting ambiguous congressional language as
it was in dealing with implied preemption. As noted, he and those who
joined him agreed that none of the plaintiff's common law damages
claims were preempted by the 1965 Act. But, as noted, he disagreed
with the plurality's interpretation of the 1969 Act.
Blackmun did not find that the language used in the 1969 Act clearly
and unambiguously manifested an intent to preempt state law tort claims.
Although state law may, in an appropriate case, "encompass the common
'41
law as well as positive enactments such as statutes and regulations,
he did not think that Congress had used the relevant phrase in that
manner in the smoking and advertising statutes.

39. Id. at 2624.
40. Id. at 2625 (Blackmun, J., concurring, in part and dissenting, in part).
41. Id. at 2627.
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Blackmun did not believe that the phrase "no requirement or prohibition" in section 5(b) encompassed common law rules. He felt his
reading was supported not only by dictionary definitions of the words
but also by the nature of common law damages actions. He pointed
out that a manufacturer facing damage awards has a wide range of
choices available. For instance, a manufacturer of cigarettes found liable
on a failure to warn claim may simply pay the damages and not alter
its package or its advertising. Alternatively, a manufacturer might decide
not to alter the warning or its advertising and avoid future damages
judgments by providing warnings "through a variety of alternative mechanisms, such as package inserts, public service advertisements, or
general educational programs. "42 Finally, Blackmun pointed out that tort
law also has a compensatory function that differentiates it from other
forms of regulation.
Examining the legislative history, Blackmun noted the stark absence
of any indication that Congress intended to preempt, let alone even deal
with, common law damages actions. As he said "there is absolutely no
suggestion in the legislative history that Congress intended to leave
plaintiffs who were injured as a result of cigarette manufacturers' unlawful conduct without any alternative remedies; yet that is the regrettable
effect of the Court's ruling today that many state common-law damages
'43
claims are preempted.
In the penultimate section of his opinion Blackmun criticized the
Court's "crazy quilt of preemption.""4 I will deal with this issue more
fully below; however, as far as Blackmun was concerned the problem
with the plurality opinion was "its frequent shift in the level of generality. ' 45 That is, the plurality had inconsistently indicated that fraudulent misrepresentation claims did not arise out of a duty based on
smoking and health but out of a general duty not to deceive, whereas
failure to warn claims arose out of smoking and health. Blackmun aptly
pointed out that failure to warn claims could just as simply be seen as
arising from a general obligation to act reasonably to inform consumers
of known risks.
Blackmun found the same logical fallacy in the plurality approach
to express warranty claims. There, the plurality stated that express
warranty claims were not imposed under state law; however, as Blackmun
(and Scalia) pointed out, the plurality did not recognize that liability
for breach of warranty arose from a state's "decision to penalize such
4
behavior through the creation of a common-law damages action. . .

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 2628.
Id. at 2630.
Id. at 2631.
Id.
Id.
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Blackmun stated that he could "perceive no principled basis for many
of the Court's asserted distinctions among the common-law claims, and
•..
[could not] believe that Congress intended to create such a hodge-

podge of allowed and disallowed claims.

....

"47

As such, he thought

that "Congress never intended to displace state common-law damages
claims, much less to cull through them in the manner" the plurality
did.
In summary, Blackmun, Souter, and Kennedy joined with the plurality insofar as the 1965 Act was concerned, finding no preemption.
However, these three did not join the group of four on the preemptive
scope of the 1969 Act; they would have found no state tort claims
preempted.
E.

Justice Scalia's Opinion

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in part, and
dissented in part. Scalia thought the Court's interpretive rule that it
would construe express preemption clauses narrowly was "extraordinary
and unprecedented. ' 49 He opined that express preemption clauses should
be construed as any other legislative provisions. He argued against any
plain meaning or narrow construction rule.
Additionally, Scalia did not think that all types of implied preemption were eliminated, or irrelevant, just because there was an express
preemption provision involved.50 Although, Scalia noted that such a
proposition may be correct when dealing with implied "field" preemption, because the "existence of an express pre-emption provision tends
to contradict any inference that Congress intended to occupy a field
broader than the statute's express language defines," 5 Justice Scalia did
not think that express preemption provisions eliminated implied preemption when state regulation would actually conflict with federal law,
or, where state regulation might stand 'as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution' of Congress's purposes.' '52 Combining the
Court's (recall Blackmun et al. did not disagree with the plurality's
interpretive guidelines) two interpretive rules Scalia thought the "extraordinary" result was that a
statute that says anything about pre-emption must say everything;
and it must do so with great exactitude as any ambiguity con-

47.
48.

49.
50.
51.
52.
(1941)).

Id.
Id.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at

2632 (Scalia, J., concurring, in part and dissenting, in part).
2633-34.
2633.
2633 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S. Ct. 399, 404
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cerning its scope will be read in favor of preserving state power.
If this is to be the law, surely only the most sporting of congresses will dare to say anything about pre-emption.53
Of course, this is a paper about torts and not about constitutional law;
however, what the Court says regarding constitutional law is relevant
to interpret the effect of the Court's judgment on future tort tobacco
claims.
Instead of interpreting the preemption provision as the plurality and
the Blackmun group would interpret it, Scalia and Thomas would have
interpreted it according to its "ordinary meaning." 5' 4 Applying an ordinary meaning rule, Scalia first turned to the pre-1969 failure to warn
claims. Scalia thought that the plurality !treated the 1965 and 1969 Acts
inconsistently. He thought that if the plurality's presumption against
preemption required a limited interpretation of the 1965 Act, it also
required a limited interpretation of the 1969 Act.
Scalia and Thomas would have found that the failure to warn claims
were preempted by both the 1965 and the 1969 Acts. They would also
have found preemption of claims "based on respondents' failure to
55
make health-related statements to consumers outside their advertising."
Turning to the 1969 Act, Scalia agreed with the plurality contention
that the language of the 1969 Act reached beyond merely positive enactments by state legislative and administrative agencies. He too felt
that general tort law duties could impose "requirements or prohibitions"
within the language of section 5(b) of the 1969 Act and that state law
included state common law. However, he disagreed with the plurality
treatment of the Cipollones' claims.
Scalia noted that the breach of warranty claims were grounded in
the proposition that in the course of their advertising and promotion
the defendants effectively made statements that cigarette smoking was
not unhealthy. He thought making such statements "civilly actionable
certainly constitutes an advertising 'requirement or prohibition ... based
on smoking and health. ' '5 6 He did not agree with the plurality that
liability based on breach of an express warranty was undertaken by the
manufacturer itself because "[wihen liability attaches to a particular
promise or representation, it attaches by law."'5 7 It is the background
law and not the act itself which makes conduct legally actionable.
As to the post-1969 fraud and misrepresentation claims, Scalia thought
the plurality erred. He found the suggestion that the duty to deceive

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 2634.
Id.
Id. at 2635.
Id.
Id.
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was a general one and not a specific one (as related to smoking and
health) was "suspect'"" because "the plurality is unwilling to apply it
consistently."5 9 Here, he echoed Justice Blackmun's criticism of the
plurality's level of generality, noting that the duty to warn, like the
duty to tell the truth, transcended "the relationship between the cigarette
companies and cigarette smokers; neither duty was specifically crafted
with an eye toward 'smoking and health."' 60
Scalia contended that the proper analytic framework was to apply
what he called a 'proximate application' methodology for determining
whether" 6' a claim invoked duties "based on smoking and health. I
would ask . . . whether, whatever the source of the duty, it imposes an
62
obligation in this case because of the effect of smoking upon health.
Applying his proximate application test, Scalia would have found that
the misrepresentation and fraud claims were preempted.
Finally, Scalia turned to a last concern. That concern was that the
plurality opinion would preserve:
not only the (somewhat fanciful) claims based on duties having
no relation to the advertising and promotion (one could imagine
a law requiring manufacturers to disclose the health hazards of
their products to a state public-health agency), but also claims
based on duties that can be complied with by taking action
either within the advertising and promotional realm or elsewhere.
Thus if-as appears to be the case in New Jersey-a State's
common law requires manufacturers to advise consumers of their
products' danger, but the law is indifferent as to how that
requirement is met (i.e., through "advertising or promotion" or
otherwise), the plurality would apparently be unprepared to find
pre-emption as long as the jury were instructed not to zero in
on deficiencies in the manufacturers' advertising or promotion.63
Scalia thought the preservation of extra-promotional warning claims
was inconsistent with preemption law. It was implausible to Scalia that
Congress intended to "save cigarette companies from being compelled
to convey such data to consumers through ... [one] means, only to
allow them to be compelled to do so through means more onerous
still.'' 64 Scalia thought that such a requirement would force cigarette
manufacturers to effectively give up the advertising and promotion im-

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 2636.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2637.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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munity which the Act provided. As to these extra-promotional warning
claims, Scalia thought the test for preemption should be "practical
compulsion, i.e., whether the law practically compels the manufacturers
to engage in behavior that Congress has barred the States from prescribing directly." 6 Applying his test, Scalia opined that a hypothetical
law which required disclosure of risks to a state regulatory agency might
survive. However, a state law requiring a cigarette manufacturer to meet
a general standard of "fair warning" concerning smoking and health
would not.
F.

The Plurality's "Response"

The plurality, in a telling footnote, responded to the criticisms
Blackmun and Scalia levelled at its shifting level of generality. The
plurality stated:
Both Justice BLACKMUN and Justice SCALIA challenge the
level of generality employed in our analysis. Justice BLACKMUN
contends that, as a matter of consistency, we should construe
failure-to-warn claims not as based on smoking and health, but
rather as based on the broader duty "to inform consumers of
known risks." Justice SCALIA contends that, again as a matter
of consistency, we should construe fraudulent misrepresentation
claims not as based on a general duty not to deceive but rather
as "based on smoking and health." Admittedly each of these
positions has some conceptional attraction. However, our ambition here is not theoretical elegance, but rather a fair understanding of congressional purpose.
To analyze failure to warn claims at the highest level of
generality (as Justice BLACKMUN would have us do) would
render the 1969 amendments almost meaningless and would pay
too little, respect to Congress' substantial reworking of the Act.
On the other hand, to analyze fraud claims at the lowest level
of generality (as Justice SCALIA would have us do) would
conflict both with the background presumption against preemption and with legislative history that plainly expresses an intent
to preserve "police regulations" of the States. 6
As such, I will not 'focus on theoretical elegance either; however, in
the following sections I will analyze the practical effect of the Cipollone
decision on cigarette cases. As noted, the plurality found certain claims
preempted and certain claims not preempted. Justice Blackmun, and
those who joined his opinion, would have found no tort claims pre-

65.
66.

Id.
Id. (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
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empted. Justices Scalia and Thomas would have found more tort claims
preempted than the plurality. As a result, the middle road which the
plurality took, although it garnered only four votes, appears to be what
we tort lawyers must deal with, as the law of the land. Consequently,
we must attempt to come to a "fair understanding" of the effect of
the various opinions on product liability in tobacco cases.
III.
A.

WHAT'S LEFT?

Product Liability Claims

Let me start this discussion with what we now generally call product
liability claims. The classic product liability claim is for mismanufacture.
These claims arise where the manufacturer has committed some error
in the manufacturing process and, as a result, the particular product,
as manufactured, deviates from otherwise identical products made by
the same manufacturer.67 Thus, imagine a cigarette which mistakenly
contained opium instead of tobacco. Or, imagine a cigarette which
mistakenly contained some deleterious substance in addition to tobacco.
If this cigarette was different from all other identical cigarettes made
by that manufacturer, the deviation would render the product unreasonably dangerous;6 if the deviation proximately caused injury to a
consumer, the manufacturer would be liable. The fact that the manufacturer neither knew nor could have known of the "defect" (mismanufacture) would be irrelevant. The contention that tar and nicotine are
dangerous substances included in cigarettes does not form the basis of
a mismanufacture claim because all cigarettes contain them. The inclusion
of those substances at the intended levels is not a deviation. The mismanufacture claim is based on the product's deviation from other products of the same line. The paradigm Louisiana mismanufacture case is
Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co.6 In Weber, circumstantial
evidence suggested that the involved product, cattle dip, contained more
than the intended (designed) amount of arsenic which resulted in personal
injury (vomiting) and property damage (dead cattle).
Neither the Cipollone case, nor the cigarette labeling statutes apply
at all in the mismanufacture context. That is, the plaintiff who smoked
a mismanufactured cigarette and was injured by it would have a product

67. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 99, at 695-96 (5th ed. 1984);
Thomas C. Galligan, The Louisiana Products Liability Act: Making Sense of It All, 49
La. L. Rev. 629, 648-53 (1989).
68. The unreasonableness calculation simply determines that the risk the product poses
is greater than its utility. Lack of knowledge is no defense in the strict product liability
case based on mismanufacture.
69. 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971).
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liability claim under state tort law, assuming the relevant state recognized
such claims. The claim would not be preempted by federal law. Of
course, one may correctly anticipate that such claims would be remarkably rare.
Secondly, Cipollone and the labelling statutes do not affect design
claims. The Cipollone defendants did not claim that the plaintiffs' design
claims were preempted. In a design claim, the plaintiff attacks the whole
product line. He or she claims that the product, as designed, is unreasonably dangerous. There are two predominate national tests for determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous in design. One,
adopted from a comment to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A,70
provides that a product is unreasonably dangerous when it is dangerous
to an extent beyond that which the ordinary consumer would anticipate.
Thus, if cigarettes posed health risks which the ordinary consumer would
not anticipate they might be unreasonably dangerous in design. Of
course, any warnings the manufacturer provided would be relevant in
determining a consumer's expectations.
Alternatively, many states employ a risk/utility test to determine
whether or not a product is unreasonably dangerous in design. If the
product's risks outweigh its utility then the product is unreasonably
dangerous. Difficult issues often arise concerning the effect of the state
of the art on the design claim. Can a defendant prevail by establishing
that, at the time that the product left the manufacturer's control, the
manufacturer neither knew nor should have known of the product's
danger so that the apparent utility of the product was greater than its
risk at the time the product left its control? Many states have determined
that state of the art evidence is admissible, although there have been
certain categories of cases (most notably asbestos cases) where courts
have rejected the state of the art defense.7"
Returning to cigarettes, the inquiry, under a risk/utility test, would
be whether or not cigarettes, as designed, posed more risks to consumers
than their usefulness justified? If state of the art evidence was not
admissible one would ask whether the actual, not the known risk of a
product, was greater than its utility. Because the risks of cigarette
smoking have been known since at least 1965, it would appear that this
type of claim would most likely arise in cases which arose before 1965.
Before the 1988 adoption of its product liability act, Louisiana was one
of the states which recognized such an unreasonably dangerous per se
claim where state of the art was inadmissible. 72 Thus, I will reserve
discussion of this issue until Part IV where the effect of Cipollone on
Louisiana law is discussed.
70. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. i (1965).
71. See, e.g., Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
72. Id.
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Note that warnings are relevant in risk utility cases as well as
consumer expectation cases. In a risk/utility case, a warning concerning
the product's risks may reduce the likelihood of the warned about risks
occurring, thus reducing the overall risk which a product poses.
Of particular importance in design cases is Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A comment (i) which provides, in part:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer....
Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the
effects of smoking may be harmful."
Thus, because tobacco cannot be made safe, one may argue that it is
not unreasonably dangerous. On the basis of comment (i), one74 court
has found cigarettes are not unreasonably dangerous in design.
Another often used route to establishing a design claim is proving
the availability of alternative safer designs. As noted, the Cipollones
pointed to the palladium cigarette as an alternative safer design for
cigarettes. However, the trial court granted a directed verdict on that
claim because the Cipollones had not established evidence from which
a reasonable juror could do anything but speculate that Rose Cipollone
would have switched to the safer cigarette or that it would have significantly reduced her risks of developing cancer. This causation problem
appears to be a significant hurdle in a design case based upon alternative
safer products, especially when the plaintiff is dead and cannot testify.
In addition to mismanufacture and design claims, a product may
be unreasonably dangerous due to the manufacturer's failure to adequately warn. Obviously, the heart of the Cipollone case involves failure
to warn claims. Under Cipollone, claims that the manufacturer failed
to provide an adequate warning on its package would be preempted
under section 5(a) of the Act. This is, of course exactly what the Supreme
Court "held" regarding section 5(b) and the failure to warn claims
relating to advertising and promotion. However, in both cases, a question
arises. That question is whether a plaintiff can bring a failure to warn
suit alleging that a cigarette manufacturer failed to adequately warn
outside the context of its package, advertising, or promotion. The crux
of such a claim, after Cipollone, would be that the manufacturer failed
to warn not through its package, advertising, or promotion but through
alternative means, such as package inserts, public service announcements,
or educational programs. It was the "preservation" of such claims that
Justice Scalia referred to as indirectly compelling cigarette manufacturers

73. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. i (1965).
74. Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying
Tennessee law).
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to do what the states could not force them to do directly. This is
particularly true in light of the plurality's presumption against preemption, a presumption to which the Blackmun group also affixed its judicial
seal of approval.
The plurality, one will recall, expressly said that the labelling acts
did not affect warning claims based "solely on respondents' testing or
research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising and promotion. ' 75 In light of this statement, the presumptions against preemption, and the fair but narrow reading accorded the express preemption
clause, extra-promotional warning claims seem alive and well after Cipollone. In fact, the Court may have breathed new life into them with
the emphasis both the plurality and Justice Scalia placed on them.
The reader will recall that Justice Scalia was particularly critical,
and concerned, that failure to warn claims arising outside the areas of
packaging, promotion, and advertising still survived. Actually, if the
preemption clause of the Act, section 5(b), is to be read narrowly, there
is an argument to be made that while additional warnings on a cigarette
package could not be required, additional warnings on a package insert
could be required. Extra promotional warnings might be required in
other media as well.
One might argue that public service announcements or educational
programs are indeed promotional; however, it seems there is an argument
to be made, given the language which the plurality used concerning the
"fair but narrow" 6 interpretation which section 5(b) required, that all
manufacturer-produced communications dealing with the health risk of
cigarettes are not promotional.
One commentator, Professor Daynard, 77 points to the plurality statement that "the [Cippollones'] concealment allegations, insofar as they
rely on a state law duty to disclose material facts through channels of
communication other than advertising or promotions, 78 are not preempted. Daynard lists the following possible ways to warn: "package
inserts, press releases, '800' hotlines, spokespeople on radio and TV
shows . . . . 79 Obviously, he does not consider such communications
media promotion or advertising. He also believes states could explicitly
order such extra-promotional warnings and not run afoul of Cipollone's
preemptive reach.80

75.
76.
77.
Federal
78.
79.
80.

Cipollone v. Leggitt Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2622 (1992).
Id. at 2621 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
Richard Daynard, Cipollone Ruling Sends Industry a Message: Say Goodbye to
License to Lie, 20 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 712 (July 3, 1992).
Id.at 713.
Id.
Id.
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In response, Professor Schwartz, now a senior partner with the
Washington, D.C. law firm of Crowell & Mooring, refers to the same
language in the plurality opinion and says:
Some pro-plaintiff advocates have said that these words create
a very broad duty to warn outside of the scope of advertising
and promotion. These observations do not comport with the
factual patterns in traditional product liability law. In general,
in products liability cases, warnings are inextricably involved
with promotional and advertising material."'
The last sentence seems an overstatement. Although many cases turn
on what is on or not on a package, many others relate to instructions,
not advertising and promotion, or the lack of a warning on the product
itself, again, not advertising or promotion. Aptly, Professor Schwartz
does note that after 1969 the risks of smoking were very well known
and it is "very unlikely that a court or jury would impose a duty on
companies to tell the public about a risk that everyone knew about. ' 8"
In a related context, one thinks of the campaigns which beer manufacturers are now engaged in to inform alcohol drinkers of the risk
of drinking and driving. Anheuser Busch Inc., for the past several years,
has reminded us, through the media, to "know when to say when."
Elsewhere, it tells us not to drink and drive. In other messages, the
brewer promotes "Family Talk About Drinking" to deal with the problems of underage drinking. Are such messages advertising and promotion? Or, are they non-promotional public service announcements to
remind us that drinking and driving is a dangerous combination? It
seems that the leading alcoholic beverage manufacturers have undertaken
to provide society with warnings outside their general advertising, warnings about the risks their products may pose if (as I am sure they would
like me to say) the products are misused or abused. Personally, I am
aware of no such programs undertaken by cigarette manufacturers.
Ultimately, the question for the Supreme Court, and for inferior
courts which must interpret the Cipollone opinions, is whether or not
claims that cigarette manufacturers have an obligation to warn outside
of advertising, promotion, and packaging are consistent with a "fair
but narrow" reading of section 5(b). Ultimately, this will require a
determination of just how serious the Supreme Court was when it said
that preemption clauses must be read narrowly. If, in fact, the Court
is serious about reading sections 5(a) and 5(b) narrowly then Justice
Scalia's concerns are apt and extra-promotional warning claims survive.

81. Victor E. Schwartz, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: A Narrow Highway in the
Sky, 20 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 709, 710 (July 3, 1992).
82. Id.
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Negligence

So much for classic product liability claims, what other tort claims
survive? It would appear, given the preemption clause and the fair but
narrow interpretation which the plurality says it requires, that general
negligence claims against cigarette manufacturers would be cognizable.
What would be the basis of this general negligence claim? There are
several possible avenues. First, one could contend that cigarette manufacturers failed to adequately test to determine the relationship between
smoking and health. That is, arguably, one could contend that if cigarette
manufacturers had been engaging in adequate health research we would
have learned that smoking was dangerous to health way before the
Surgeon General's 1964 report.
Moreover, one might argue that merely making and selling cigarettes,
given their known risks, constitutes unreasonable conduct. This obviously
would require a finding that 1) cigarette manufacturers knew or should
have known of the risks of cigarette smoking and 2) that cigarette
manufacturers failed to act reasonably in continuing to produce and sell
their products. As Prosser, Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, and Owen note:
In short, even if a seller [or manufacturer] had done all that
he could reasonably have done to warn about a risk or hazard
related to the way a product was designed, it could be that a
reasonable person would conclude that the magnitude of the
reasonably foreseeable harm as designed outweighed the utility
of the product as so designed. 3
84
One might call such products "bad" products.
This negligence claim is precisely the type of claim to which, I
believe, Professor Henderson 5 would most object. It would involve a
jury or judge engaging in social balancing of the risk and utility of
cigarettes. Of course, figured into the calculus (as it is in a product
liability case as well) either as an element of the plaintiff's case, or as
a defense, would be the fact that, at least since 1965, anyone smoking
cigarettes was aware to some degree (and that degree increased) of the
serious risks of smoking. Obviously, one could argue that a manufacturer
has no duty to protect one from a known risk he or she voluntarily
encounters. However, whether an addict has the ability to engage in

83. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 67, § 96, at 688-89. Interestingly, the same claim
could be made against a seller or retailer of cigarettes given the widespread knowledge
of the risks of cigarette smoking. Here we see most drastically the conflict between letting
buyers decide for themselves what they want to buy and holding others liable to protect
buyers from their own desires (addictions).
84. Id. at 689.
85. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., JudicialReview of Manufacturers' Conscious
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1531 (1973).
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the type of cool, rational balancing which the tort doctrine of assumption
of risk seems to presuppose is an open question. The addict analysis
also undercuts the notion that tort liability is designed to force the seller
to price its product to include accident costs, thus presenting the consumer with an "accurate" price. This is because the addicts' demand
for the product would seem to be inelastic. He will pay the price, no
matter how high.
One may wonder whether or not a court ought to impose a special
obligation, or a higher degree of care, on the manufacturer of an
addictive product. Where a product has an addictive potential which
may have a serious effect on health (as I think most do), then should
the manufacturer of that product have a particularly high obligation to
purchasers of the product to make sure that the product's overall utility
outweighs the risks it poses? Of course, one would think that the most
apposite duty of a seller of an addictive product (short of not selling
it) would be to warn those using the product of its addictive potential.
However, such a warning claim relating to cigarettes and the package,
promotion, or advertising would appear to be preempted after Cipollone.
As noted, an extra-promotional warning claim may well be available.
Whatever one might conclude about such a negligence claim, it
would appear that it is not preempted by federal law after Cipollone.
As noted, the Cipollone district court directed a verdict on a general
negligence claim because it thought the claim was subsumed under the
plaintiff's design and warning claims. 6
C.

Fraud and Misrepresentation

State tort fraud or misrepresentation claims remain actionable after
Cipollone. A misrepresentation claim involves a false representation made
by the defendant. Usually, the representation must be one of fact. The
defendant must have known, or believed, that the representation was
false. This is the point at which fault becomes relevant in a misrepresentation case. The misrepresentation may be intentional, negligent,
or, in some cases, even innocent. The defendant must have an intention
to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting in reliance upon
the statement. The plaintiff must justifiably rely upon the defendant's
representation in acting or failing to act. Finally, the plaintiff must
suffer damages as a result of his or her reliance.87 So, if a cigarette
manufacturer made a fraudulent statement in, or outside, advertising or
promotion, which was knowingly false and which was intended to and

86. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1499 (D.N.J. 1988).
87. See, e.g., Prosser and Keeton, supra note 67, § 105, at 728.
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did justifiably induce reliance which damaged the plaintiff, the claim
would be actionable.
As noted above, the fraud claim would not be actionable to the
extent that the plaintiff alleged that fraudulent statements undermined
the effect of the federally prescribed warnings. Interestingly, the same
day that the United States Supreme Court decided the Cipollone case
it vacated a judgment and remanded a case to the First Circuit Court
of Appeals. In that case, the First Circuit had held that fraud and
misrepresentation claims were preempted by the labelling acts."s
D. Conspiracy, Intentional Torts and Punitive Damages After
Cipollone
In addition to fraud claims, as noted, a plaintiff, could allege that
cigarette manufacturers had conspired to suppress information regarding
the dangers of cigarettes. This claim is not preempted. Likewise, it would
not seem that an intentional tort claim would be preempted.
A battery is the intentional infliction of a harmful or offensive
contact. Intent requires a desire that the contact occurs or a substantial
certainty that the harmful contact will occur. Arguably, one could get
by a motion to dismiss in a battery case by alleging that cigarette
companies were substantially certain that 'smoking would lead to a
harmful or offensive contact (of smoke with lungs). Of course, consent
would be the key issue in such a case. If a plaintiff consented to the
contact but, due to the failure to provide full information of the health
risks of cigarettes, did not know of the true risks of smoking, the
consent to the contact may be vitiated. Consent, would be less of a
hurdle for the plaintiff in a "secondary smoke" case.a 9
Finally, as an aside, it would seem that Cipollone has no affect on
state remedial -law. The definition and measure of compensatory damages
are left to state law. Additionally, Cipollone does not affect punitive
damages claims against cigarette manufacturers. Thus, if a plaintiff could
establish the requisite mental state and a non-preempted substantive
claim, then punitive damages should be available after Cipollone.
E.

Warranty

As the reader recalls, the Supreme Court held that U.C.C. section
2-313 express warranty claims are based on the parties' contract, not
state law, and, thus, are not preempted. The U.C.C. provides not only
for express warranties but also for implied warranties: the warranty of
merchantability and the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.

88.
89.

Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 112 S. Ct. 3019 (1992).
See infra text at Part IV(A).
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The most important of these two is the warranty of merchantability.
Under U.C.C. section 2-314 a seller, which may include the manufacturer, warrants that its product will be merchantable. The concept
of merchantability supposes that a product will be fit for its ordinary
purposes. In Cipollone, the plurality treated express warranty claims as
contract claims which were not preempted. Arguably, an implied warranty claim is also a non-preempted contract claim. As such, extending
the logic of the plurality, the section 2-314 implied warranty claim would
not be preempted.
The section 2-314 claim arises out of the conduct of the warrantor,
in selling its product. Some states provide that implied warranty claims
are only actionable for contract damages, leaving tort or personal injury
damages to tort cases. Obviously, in such a state, the availability of
the U.C.C. section 2-314 claim would not mean much, as damages
would be limited to the difference between the value of the cigarettes
purchased, as warranted, and as is. 91 However, in a state which allowed
recovery of personal injury damages for violation of the warranty of
merchantability, the claim would not be preempted. U.C.C. section 2715(2)(b) provides that personal injury damages may be recoverable for
92
breach of warranty.
IV.

THE QUAGMIRME

As Part II outlines, there are many claims still available to the
cigarette plaintiff after Cipollone. Interestingly, the ultimate effect of
Cipollone may, in many states, be most evident at the pleading stage.
This is ironic in light of the fact that the federal rules and most state
codes of civil procedure now require only notice pleading. However,
Cipollone forces plaintiffs, defendants, and courts to carefully examine
pleadings and the causes of action they allege. One recalls footnote 27
to the plurality opinion which stated that although both the general
approach of Justice Blackmun and the specific approach of Justice Scalia
were theoretically attractive they failed to adequately grasp Congress'
purpose. One may doubt whether the plurality's compromise provides
us with a middle of the road interpretation of Congress' elusive intent
or whether it reminds us that "the middle of the road is for road
kill." 93 A hypothetical may be the best way to present some of the
problems and inconsistencies.

90.
91.
92.

See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-714, lB U.L.A. 371 (1988).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-715(2)(b), IB U.L.A. 417 (1988) ("Consequential

damages ... include ... injury to person or property proximately resulting from any

breach of warranty.").
93. The quote in text was inspired by the work of Louden Wainwright, Ill. See,
e.g., Louden Wainwright, Ill, There's a Dead Skunk in the Middle of the Road.
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Imagine a billboard advertising "Ostrich" cigarettes. Under federal
law, the billboard must provide the federally mandated warning. So,
assume that the billboard states, in a box in the bottom right-hand
corner, that smoking is dangerous to health. Likewise, imagine that in
the top left-hand corner the billboard states that "Ostrich Cigarettes
Are Safe." (I know this is unrealistic but it helps me to make my points
and being unrealistic is, according to some, characteristic of my profession.) Suppose also, that on the billboard itself is a beautiful woman
standing arm and arm with a handsome man on the beach next to an
Ostrich with its head in the sand. Now, the question, under Cipollone
and the acts which it interprets, is: what claims are available to a
plaintiff who smokes Ostrich cigarettes after seeing the billboard and
contracts cancer?
First, can the plaintiff claim that the defendant cigarette manufacturer failed to provide an adequate warning because the phrase "Ostrich
cigarettes are safe" effectively undermined the effect of the warning
provided? That is, can the plaintiff argue that the defendant should
have provided a better warning, or a more thorough warning, in light
of the statement that "Ostrich Cigarettes Are Safe?" The answer, under
the Cipollone plurality, seems to be no. This is because any decision
holding that the warning was inadequate, in light of the statement
"Ostrich Cigarettes Are Safe" would be a requirement or prohibition
based upon state law which required that the defendant's warnings
'
include "additional, or more clearly stated" 94
warnings than those federally mandated. The Cipollone plurality said that such claims were
preempted. Thus, the statement "Ostrich Cigarettes Are Safe" would
not be actionable as the basis of a failure to warn claim. The statement's
alleged undermining of the effect of the required warning is legally, if
not actually, irrelevant. On a motion to dismiss this warning claim, a
court most probably should, after Cipollone, grant the motion. As noted,
perhaps there is another warning claim not related to purchasing, advertising, or promotion; however, any warning claim based on the statement in the advertising itself would seem to be preempted.
What about a statement made through the Tobacco Institute, an
organization formed and composed, in part, by cigarette manufacturers?
Suppose the Tobacco Institute said "Cigarettes Are Safe." Arguably, a
statement by the Institute would not be promotion or advertising. Here
again, one would face the question of whether all statements made by
the manufacturer of a product constitute promotion and advertising.
The plaintiff would also have to establish a connection between the
particular manufacturer and the Institute.

94. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2621 (1992) (plurality opinion
of Stevens, J.).
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Returning to the billboard, what about a claim that the statement
"Ostrich Cigarettes Are Safe" was an express warranty, pursuant to
U.C.C. section 2-313? I believe, under the Cipollone plurality that this
claim would not be barred. Pursuant to the plurality opinion, the express
warranty claim is one which is based not on state law but upon what
the manufacturer said. Here, the manufacturer said that "Ostrich Cigarettes Are Safe." But what about the federally mandated warning on
the sign? The warning would raise the question whether the statement
"Cigarettes Are Safe" actually formed a part of "the basis of the
bargain" as required by the Code." Justice Stevens noted this point in
his opinion when he stated that the fact that the terms of a warranty
are set forth in advertisements would be irrelevant "though possibly not
to the state law issue of whether the alleged warranty is valid and
enforceable. ' 9 6 The statement about Ostrich cigarettes being safe would
also need to be read in light of the fact that most of us now believe
that cigarettes are not safe.
How about a fraud claim based on the statement "Ostrich Cigarettes
Are Safe?" Again, as noted above, under the plurality opinion, the
statement would not be actionable to the extent that the allegation was
that the statement undermined the effect of the federally mandated
warning. However, it would be actionable to the extent that the plaintiff
alleged the statement was your basic lie-i.e., the statement was not
true. Plaintiff would also have to establish the other elements of fraud.
One might wonder whether or not letting this claim proceed is really
consistent with the "fair but narrow" 97 reading of the relevant portions
of the cigarette labeling acts; however, it seems a point upon which
reasonable minds could disagree and one upon which we could anticipate
inconsistent opinions from state and federal lower courts.
As can be seen, the result of Cipollone, inconsistently enough, is
that various claims based on the statement "Ostrich Cigarettes Are Safe"
would be preempted, whereas, others would not. It would be the job
of the trial judge in such a case to consider the pleadings carefully and
to determine what causes of action were raised, which were preempted,
and which were not. Before turning to Louisiana, let me consider a
specific context, not at issue in Cipollone, but one on which we can
anticipate future claims: the secondary smoke problem.
A.

Secondary Smoke Claims

Recent studies have indicated that secondary smoke may be potentially more harmful to health than previously believed. 8 Secondary smoke

95.
96.
97.
98.

Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313 (a), IA U.L.A. 101 (1989).
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2623 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
Id. at 2621.
See, e.g., USA Today, July 22, 1991, at Dl; Chicago Tribune, Jan. 11, 1991,
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is smoke inhaled by a non-smoker who is in physical proximity to a
smoker. These studies tell us secondary smokers may suffer serious
adverse health consequences from inhaling secondary smoke. As Professor Phillips points out,9 secondary smoke claims, unlike a direct
smoker's claims, are not as susceptible to the defenses of contributory
(or comparative) negligence and assumption of the risk. What affect
will Cipollone have on secondary smoke claims?
Cipollone should have no affect at all on mismanufacture claims;
however, secondary smoke claims would probably not involve mismanufacture claims. The child who inhales some deleterious substance mistakenly placed in a cigarette his or her parent was smoking, however,
would have a claim. Additionally, it would seem that secondary smoke
victims would have design claims which are not preempted by Cipollone.
Once again, one would have to look to state law to determine the
applicable elements of this design claim. If the relevant state used the
consumer expectation test, one might anticipate that secondary smoke
claims could be successful. Query, does Restatement (Second) comment
(i)'s notion of the dangerous product and its undertones of individual
responsibility and accountability apply when the dangerous product harms
someone who has not made a decision to use that product? Comment
(i)'s reach would not seem to be that long. If applicable state law
considers the risk and utility of cigarettes, the utility to secondary
smokers seems rather low.
However, if, under state law, the plaintiff must establish that an
alternative design existed which would have minimized the damages from
secondary smoke, the issue becomes trickier. Would it have been possible
to manufacture a cigarette which posed less danger to victims of secondary smoke? I doubt that such technology would be limited to victims
of secondary smoke. That is, if such a cigarette were possible to manufacture, it would no doubt reduce the risk to smokers, as well as
secondary smokers. Critically, the availability of devices to reduce smoke
in a room or building are most relevant to secondary smoke claims.
Their existence seems to favor the manufacturer while implicating the
smoker who does not use such a device to protect family members or
co-workers. The issue is whether the smoker's failure to take steps to
protect secondary" smokers shifts responsibility away from the manufacturer. This is a scope of the risk problem, pure and simple (i.e.,
proximate cause, legal cause, etc.).

at C4; Los Angeles Times, Dec. 16, 1990, at A18, cbl. 1. See also Butler v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., (Miss. Cir. Ct. Hinds Cty., 1st Jud. Dist. No. 92-73361) (Oct. 21, 1992)
(secondary smoke suit seeking $125,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages).
99. For a discussion of secondary smoke claims, see Jerry J. Phillips, Products
Liability in a Nutshell, 74-75 (1988).
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What about a warning claim? What about the obligation of cigarette
manufacturers to warn secondary smoke victims that the inhalation of
smoke, even by someone not smoking a cigarette, may be hazardous
to health? This would seem to be the most likely basis for the secondary
smoke victim's claim. However, note the potential preemption problems
under Cipollone. If the claim would involve additional statements in
advertising and promotion regarding the risk of secondary smoke then
it would seem that a failure to warn claim would be preempted under
the express language of the plurality opinion in Cipollone. To the extent
that the plaintiff's claim was based on a failure to warn in other media,
the claim might proceed. However, the plurality did say that express
preemption clauses were to be read narrowly. In light of this fact, a
plaintiff might argue that there is absolutely no evidence that Congress
intended, in any way, to affect secondary smokers' claims. Congress'
concerns about smoking and health involved smokers, not secondary
smokers. Thus, one might reasonably conclude that it would be unreasonable to preempt claims by secondary smokers when Congress gave
absolutely no indication that it meant to deal with the secondary smoke
issue.
What about fraud? There may be two possible avenues available
for secondary smoke fraud claims following Cipollone. First, if plaintiffs
could establish that manufacturers made false statements regarding the
risk of secondary smoke, those claims would not be preempted. The
second possible claim is that cigarette companies, through the Tobacco
Institute, arguably have made statements that the risks of damage from
secondary smoke are not as great as other studies have indicated. Of
course, the problem here is that some statements by the Institute, particularly the most recent, have been made in response to scientific studies.
The most recent Tobacco Institute's statements question the validity of
studies proclaiming secondary smoke risks. It would be ironic if one
were not allowed to publicly question the validity of scientific studies
(or at least not to call for additional studies) before drawing a conclusion
without incurring liability. To make such statements actionable would
seem to be contrary to our shared notions about the value of open
debate. Of course, a pattern of bad faith denials may compel a different
conclusion. Likewise, if it could be shown that the Tobacco Institute's
statements were knowingly false, then, perhaps, the statements would
be actionable.
Thus, with secondary smoke we are left, after Cipollone, with a
legal environment where the most promising claim, failure to warn, may
be preempted, at least in relation to the package, advertising, or promotion. Other claims involving secondary smoke and cigarettes are available; however, mismanufacture claims seem rare, while fraud claims and
design claims may be difficult to establish. Perhaps, here, one could
argue that the mere sale of cigarettes poses a risk of unreasonable harm

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

to victims of secondary smoke, and that it is negligence, in and of
itself, to sell cigarettes because of the risks cigarettes pose to secondary
smokers. As noted above, such a claim would not be preempted under
Cipollone.
V.
A.

LOUISIANA CLAIMS

Pre-LPLA Claims

Moving from the national scene to Louisiana, I will now address
cigarette liability under Louisiana law after Cipollone. It will be necessary
to break the discussion down into two sections, one dealing with preLouisiana Product Liability Act (LPLA) claims, and the other dealing
with post-LPLA claims. The Louisiana Legislature passed the LPLA in
1988 and, in so doing, made some significant changes in Louisiana
law.100 Prior to the passage of the LPLA, plaintiffs had several viable
theories against product manufacturers: strict product liability, negligence, fraud, and redhibition. Let me begin with the strict product
liability claims.
The most cogent and complete discussion of pre-LPLA strict liability
law was set forth in Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.'0° In Halphen, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in response to a certified question,
set forth the four ways in which a product could be unreasonably
dangerous under pre-LPLA Louisiana law: unreasonably dangerous per
se, unreasonably dangerous due to mismanufacture, unreasonably dangerous in design, and unreasonably dangerous for failure to warn.
A product was unreasonably dangerous per se if its danger, in fact,
outweighed its utility. (This claim was mentioned in the discussion of
design claims in Part II.) In an unreasonably dangerous per se product
liability case, state of the art evidence was inadmissible. The unreasonably
dangerous per se claim against the cigarette manufacturer would be that
cigarettes were unreasonably dangerous per se because the risks they
presented outweighed their utility. The risks that cigarettes pose would
include the risk of vancer, the risk of heart disease, risks to smoking
pregnant mothers, risks to secondary smokers, and all the other health
risks with which we have become familiar over the past twenty-five
years. The utility of cigarettes, it would seem, would be two-fold:
pleasure and economic benefits through sales and jobs. 0 2 Prior to Cipollone, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that
claims that cigarettes were unreasonably dangerous per se were not

100. See John Kennedy, A Primer on the Louisiana Products Liability Act, 49 La.
L. Rev. 565 (1989); Galligan, supra note 67.
101. 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
102. But see Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 283 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding
that cigarette companies are not entitled to offer evidence concerning the collateral benefits
of cigarette smoking).
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preempted by the advertising acts. 0 3 The United States Supreme Court
noted the Fifth Circuit's decision in Cipo/lone.'°4 This decision would
seem not to be disturbed.
Last year, in Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co.,I °S the Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed a finding by the trial court and the first circuit
court of appeal that a defendant cigarette manufacturer was entitled to
summary judgment on an unreasonably dangerous per se claim. Gilboy
had begun smoking in 1940. He was diagnosed with cancer of the lungs
and brain in 1986. The court of appeal, in an opinion tinged with
notions of personal responsibility, had basically held cigarettes were not
unreasonably dangerous per se because the smoker, Gilboy, had assumed
the risk of adverse health consequences from smoking. The Louisiana
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Watson, reversed. The court's
decision answered several key questions concerning the Louisiana Products Liability Act, the role of the jury in an unreasonably dangerous
per se case, and the place of assumption of the risk in a cigarette/
product liability case after Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc."'6
Justice Watson's opinion began with the risk utility test applicable
in an unreasonably dangerous per se case. He indicated that whether
the danger in fact of cigarettes outweighed their utility was a question
for the jury. On that basis, summary judgment in the defendant's favor
had been improper. As Justice Watson stated: "Using Halphen's risk/
utility test, a jury must determine whether cigarettes are unreasonably
dangerous per se."' 07 Thus, it would seem the jury gets to balance the
risks and utility of cigarettes in a Louisiana cigarette unreasonably
dangerous per se product liability case. Interestingly, two sentences earlier, Watson wrote: "Since normal use of cigarettes causes lung cancer,
the risk from smoking cigarettes is enormous, while its utility is virtually
nil."" 0 8 This is powerful language, indeed. What effect will this language
have? Is it a legal conclusion? The first quoted sentence about the jury
deciding whether a product is unreasonably dangerous per se would seem
to suggest that the statement about the utility of cigarettes is not a legal
conclusion. Could Watson's statement be the basis of a motion for
directed verdict? Again, the sentence about the jury suggests otherwise,
but saying that the utility of cigarettes is virtually nil is pretty strong
stuff. Could it be read to the jury as part of an instruction on the risk
utility balance? Justice Dennis joined in the court's opinion in Oilboy

103.
law).
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying Louisiana
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2613 n.2 (1992).
582 So. 2d 1263 (La. 1991).
521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988).
Gilboy, 582 So. 2d at 1264.
Id.
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but preferred not to express any opinion on the utility or risk of
cigarettes. ,09
Of course, saying that the jury must decide whether cigarettes are
unreasonably dangerous per se presupposes that the LPLA, which does
not provide for this category of recovery, does not apply retroactively.
That is precisely what the court in Gilboy held. The defendants had
argued that the LPLA was merely interpretative and could be applied
retroactively.1 0 Justice Watson summarily rejected the defendant's argument stating that "since the Act alters substantive rights, it is not
retroactive and does not apply to this lawsuit. A statute that changes
... law relating to substantive rights only has prospective effect.""'
One may wonder whether or not Justice Watson's statements are limited
to the substantive aspects of the LPLA and, arguably, inapplicable to
purely procedural aspects. You see, the language the court used in Gilboy
refering to the act as a whole, went beyond its holding. The holding
was merely that the LPLA (insofar as it eliminates per se claims) is
not retroactive.
Earlier, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an
opinion written by the late Judge Alvin B. Rubin, Lavespere v. Niagara
Machine & Tool Works, Inc.," 2 had held that Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:2800.56 (2)(b), dealing with the burden of proof on the risk utility
balance in a design case, was purely procedural. Thus, the court applied
that section of the LPLA retroactively. Justice Watson's opinion in
Gilboy talks of the "Act" which seems to imply that no part of the
LPLA should be applied retroactively. However, Watson did say that
no part of the LPLA should be applied "to this lawsuit [Gilboy]"
leaving open, I suppose, the question of whether Lavespere is the law
concerning purely procedural portions of the act. In my humble opinion,
to the extent the LPLA is substantive, it is clearly not retroactive. To
the extent that it may be purely procedural, it probably does not make
much difference in the great run of cases whether or not the act is
applied retroactively., Unfortunately for the plaintiff in Lavespere, Lavespere was one of those cases where it did make a difference. On the
retroactivity question, Justice Dennis, in Gilboy, separately stated: "strictly
speaking the Legislature may repeal or change law but it cannot overrule
' 3
or reverse decisions of the courts interpreting the law.""
109. Id. at 1266 (Dennis, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 1264. For a scholarly articulation of this contention see David L. Browne,
Note, When the Smoke Clears, Where Will Louisiana Stand? An Analysis of Louisiana
Liability Doctrine in Tobacco Litigation?, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 417 (1990).

111. Gilboy, 582 So. 2d at 1264-65.
112. 910 F.2d 167, reh'g. denied, 920 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1990). Cf. Miles v. Olin
Corp., 922 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1991) (the LPLA's substantive provisions are not to be
applied retroactively).
113. Gilboy, 582 So. 2d at 1266 (Dennis, J., concurring).
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As for the assumption of the risk issue, Justice Watson indicated
that if Gilboy knowingly assumed the risk of smoking, there was a
comparative fault question for the jury. Thus, apparently, smoking,
despite knowledge of the risk of smoking, would go to reduce recovery,
not to bar it. While discussing this issue, the court noted there were
factual questions about Gilboy's competence when he allegedly became
addicted to smoking. That is, did he have the ability "to recognize the
danger; to appreciate the nature and extent of the risk; and to voluntarily
expose himself to that risk . . . [?],,114 I will return to this comparative
fault issue in a moment.
Continuing, the Gilboy court distinguished alcohol, handguns, and
assault rifles from cigarettes because all of those other products, unlike
cigarettes, can be used safely."' The normal use of cigarettes, according
to the court, is dangerous. The reader will recall that this is precisely
what Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment (i) says.
Justice Watson further noted that the early warnings on cigarettes
were "mild" and that federally mandated warnings only began specifically warning about cancer as an effect of smoking one year before
Gilboy was diagnosed as suffering from lung and brain cancer. One
wonders whether or not the weakness of the warning is a cognizable
claim after Cipollone. I believe that the weakness of the warning insofar
as it relates to a failure to warn claim is preempted; however, one could
argue that the effect of the warning insofar as it relates to the risk of
cigarettes in a design case, particularly the probability of harm, may
still be considered by the jury. This is analogous to the jury's consideration of a warning in determining whether or not an express warranty
claim has been created. Watson expressly noted this point when, in
reference to warnings and unreasonably dangerous per se products, he
stated that a warning on an unreasonably dangerous per se product
reduces, but does not eliminate, liability. "The adequacy of a manufacturer's warnings is a factor in assessing comparative fault." 1 6 Additionally, it seems to me, it is a factor in determining a product's
danger-in-fact-the better the warning, the less danger the product would
pose. Justice Cole concurred in the result in Gilboy. As noted, Justice
Dennis concurred and assigned separate reasons. Justices Lemmon and
Marcus did not participate in the case. Judges Lobrano and Norris sat
in their stead.
In summary, under Cipollone and Gilboy, the unreasonably dangerous per se claim survives for pre-1988 injuries. In addition, the
Halphen opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized claims for

114. Id. at 1265.
115. Id.

116. Gilboy, 582 So. 2d at 1265.
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mismanufacture, design, and failure to warn. The mismanufacture discussion really is no different than the general mismanufacture discussion
that appears above.
The Halphen design claims were threefold, a product was unreasonably dangerous in design if: 1) it was unreasonably dangerous per
se, 2) alternative safer products existed, and 3) alternative safer designs
for the product existed. These pre-1988 claims also seem to be cognizable
under Cipollone; however, the plaintiff would have to come up with
an alternative product or an alternative design.
Halphen also recognized a failure to warn claim. Here, post-1969
(pre-LPLA) claims are, to the extent they relate to promotion and
advertising, preempted under Cipollone. As noted above, Louisiana, like
other jurisdictions, may still provide a failure to warn claim for these
years, based on the reasoning that a better warning should have been
provided outside the package, advertising or promotion.
In addition to product liability claims, a plaintiff, prior to the passage
of the LPLA, could have sued a cigarette manufacturer for plain, old
negligence under Civil Code articles. 2315 and 2316.117 This would be
very similar to the unreasonably dangerous per se claim, except that
the plaintiff would have to show that the manufacturer knew or should
have known of the dangers associated with smoking when it manufactured or sold the product. In a per se case, this knowledge is presumed,
but, in a negligence case, knowledge must be proven. Thus, pre-LPLA
law on this score was similar to national law on the subject. Additionally,
prior to 1988, plaintiffs could have filed fraud claims and any other
general tort claims which were then available to them under pre-LPLA
Louisiana tort law.
Moreover, under Philippe v. Browning Arms Co.,18 a plaintiff could
have cumulated redhibition and tort claims. 19 Assuming that a court
found that a product that was unreasonably dangerous had a redhibitory
defect, the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover not only damages, but also attorney's fees under Civil Code article 2545 which provides that a bad faith seller is liable for attorney's fees. A bad faith
seller is one who knows of the defects in the thing sold; a manufacturer
is presumed to know of the defects in its thing. Thus, a manufacturer
was a bad faith seller liable for attorney's fees.
Before turning to the LPLA itself, some questions arise about the
effective date of the LPLA, Cipollone, and defenses, and these questions
must now occupy us. I assume that a plaintiff, who developed cancer

117. See Hunt v. Ford Motor Co., 341 So. 2d 614 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
118. 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1980).
119. See generally David W. Robertson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Products
in Louisiana Law, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 50 (1975).
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or other adverse health consequences as a result of smoking which were
discovered and diagnosed prior to 1988, would be allowed to bring preLPLA claims. However, what about the smoker who developed cancer
prior to 1988 but did not discover it until after the effective date of
the LPLA? It would seem that the claim would not be prescribed under
the discovery rule, the fourth category of contra non valentem; however,
what substantive law would govern the claim? Just because a claim is
not prescribed does not mean that it has not otherwise accrued. Arguably,
the law at the time of the development of the cancer should control,
here, pre-LPLA law. Finally, what about the person who smoked prior
to 1988, but did not develop cancer until after 1988? Should the pre1988 exposure entitle the plaintiff to rely upon pre-LPLA law? Or, is
the plaintiff limited to pursuing claims under the LPLA? Or, do two
sets of law govern the case? That is, would pre-1988 law govern for
say cancerphobia or for causing a disposition for cancer whereas the
cancer claim would have to be brought under the LPLA?
Some guidance is provided by the Louisiana Supreme Court's recent
decisions in Cole v. Celotex Corp. 20 and Champagne v. Celotex Corp. 12,
The cases involve questions of comparative fault, contribution, and
insurance coverage. In Cole, asbestos workers sought damages for injuries arising from long-term exposure to asbestos from the insurer of
their employer's executive officers and from various asbestos manufacturers. The executive officers were liable under the pre-1976 version of
the Louisiana Worker's Compensation law. 22 The Cole plaintiffs subsequently settled with the defendant manufacturers. The third circuit
had found that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued before 1976, and
neither side contested that finding. 123 In rendering that decision, the
third circuit used the contraction theory.'1 The supreme court discussed
the contraction theory in a footnote to its Cole opinion. 25 It noted that
exposure "is different from contraction.' 26 As the fourth circuit had
said in a silicosis case, Faciane v. Southern Shipbuilding Corp.,127 injury,
in a long-latency occupational disease case, occurs when "the cumulation

120. 599 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1992).
121. 599 So. 2d. 1086 (La. 1992).
122. See 1914 La. Acts No. 20, §§ 34-35, as amended by 1918 La. Acts No. 38, § 1,
as amended by 1976 La. Acts No. 147, § I (codified as amended at La. R.S. 23:1032
(Supp. 1992)).
123. Cole, 559 So. 2d at 1064 n.16.
124. Cole v. Celotex Corp., 588 So. 2d 376, 388 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 599
So. 2d 1088 (1992).
125. Cole, 599 So. 2d at 1076 n.54.
126. Id.
127. 446 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
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of exposure reache[s] the point where the plaintiff contract[s] the disease." 2 In Faciane, the fourth circuit said:
It seems implicit from much of the medical evidence that once
silica dust has so damaged and maimed the body that the
fibrogenic effects of silica inhalation will progress independent
of further exposure, a disease has been contracted. It is at this
point and not before that the consequences of exposure to silica
becomes inevitable and in our opinion, actionable. The victim's
body has been injured just as surely as if it had been hit by a
truck. 129
Thus, a cause of action for cancer or other damage from smoking may
accrue under the contraction theory before the disease manifests itself.
If the contraction theory pointed to pre-1988 contraction, pre-LPLA law
would apply. Interestingly, in Cole the Supreme Court of Louisiana
noted the difficulties inherent in the contraction theory, 30 and left "for
another day ... resolution of the continued viability of the contraction
theory in the context in which it arose."''
In Cole itself, pre-1976 law applied to the claims against the insurer
of the executive officers because the third circuit found "plaintiffs
contracted asbestos-related disease prior to 1976." ; 32 Thus, pre-1976 law
was clearly applicable. On a related and critical point, the insurer had
contended that the plaintiffs could not recover under pre-1976 law for
post-1976 fear of getting cancer. The third circuit rejected that argument,
because the plaintiffs' "causes of action" accrued before 1976, and the
accrued claims would "include prospective damages occurring after 1976,
such as fear, pain and suffering, loss of wages .
,,."I Under this logic,
contraction of any smoking-related disease prior to 1988 might make
other smoking related diseases diagnosed (or even contracted) after 1988
cognizable tort claims under pre-1988 law. Thus, a smoker who has pre1988 emphysema (as a result of smoking) may be able to maintain an
unreasonably dangerous per se product liability claim as to post-1988
cancer. This is potentially critical because the unreasonably dangerous
4
per se claim is not available under the LPLA.

128.

Id. at 773.

129. Id.
130. Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1076 n.54 (La. 1992).
131. Id.
132. Cole v. Celotex Corp., 588 So. 2d 376, 388 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 599
So. 2d 1058 (1992).
133. Id.
134. For a cogent and convincing analysis of the relevant prescription problems and
a sensible solution relying on the discovery rule and the disaggregation of particular claims
see Cole, 599 So. 2d at 1083-86 (Dennis, J., concurring).
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Cole and Champagnealso raise interesting questions regarding smoking cases and comparative fault. Suppose that a plaintiff began smoking
prior to 1980, when Louisiana passed its comparative fault statute.
Should that smoker's recovery be barred by contributory negligence or
assumption of the risk if those defenses are established? Or, should
post-1980 comparative fault principles apply to the case? In Cole, one
issue was whether or not pre- or post-1980 comparative fault law should
be used to determine the virile share of settling tortfeasors. 135 The
plaintiffs had. sued the insurer of the executive officers of the place
where they had worked, as well as various manufacturers of asbestos.
The plaintiffs had settled with the asbestos manufacturers and proceeded
to trial against the insurer. At trial, the insurer contended that since
the jury had found that the manufacturers were ninty-five percent at
fault and the executive officers were only five percent at fault, post1980 comparative fault principles should apply to determine the virile
share of the settling defendants. 3 6 If that had been the case, then the
plaintiff would have only been entitled to recover five percent of the
damage from the insurer.
The court looked at the legislation creating new Civil Code article
2323 and which made certain substantive changes to Civil Code article
1804, the relevant article for determining the virile share of a settling
tortfeasor."7 The Act also made changes to the Code of Civil Procedure. 3 The court decided that the time when plaintiffs' causes of action
accrued would not be used to determine the applicability of the comparative fault package.
The Act by which the comparative fault package was passed provided
that it would not apply to "events" occurring before the effective date
of the Act. Thus, the court chose to employ an "events" test, rather
than a cause of action test. In this regard, the court determined that
where there were sufficient pre-1980 tortious exposures, pre-comparative
fault principles would apply even though a disease may not have actually
been contracted, or manifested itself, until later.1 9 In Cole, the court
applied pre-comparative fault law and allocated shares by the head and
not by percentages of fault. Actually, in Cole, this discussion of events
versus accrual of the cause of action was dicta because, as noted, the
court of appeal had determined that the plaintiffs' causes of action had
accrued prior to 1980. However, in the companion case, Champagne,'4°
the lower courts had not determined that the plaintiffs' causes of action

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Cole, 599 So. 2d at 1062-74.
See La. Civ. Code art. 1803.
1979 La. Acts No. 431.
See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1812.
Cole, 599 So. 2d at 1066.
Champagne v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1086 (La. 1992).
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had accrued. Thus, in footnote 17 in Cole, the court, referring to
Champagne, stated that it refused to rest its decision in Cole on the
cause of action logic because that would necessitate an additional hearing
in Champagne on whether the Champagne plaintiffs' causes of action
had accrued.'14 Thus, the events discussion in Cole, as well as footnote
17, are really more apposite to Champagne. In Champagne, where there
was no finding that the plaintiffs' causes of action had accrued before
1980, the court affirmed the third circuit's decision to apply pre-1980
law.
One could argue that Cole is clearly distinguishable from a case
where a plaintiff is suing a cigarette manufacturer and the plaintiff's
fault is at issue. This is because in Cole the issue was the virile shares
of settling defendants. However, in Champagneone of the issues before
the court was what law should apply to determine the effect of the
plaintiffs' alleged fault. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held, under
its events test, that pre-1980 law, contributory negligence, would apply.
Thus, it seems that if the jury in Champagne finds that the plaintiffs
are at fault, the plaintiffs' recovery against the executive officers' insurer
would be barred.
Once again, however, Champagne is distinguishable from a cigarette
case. A cigarette case is against a product manufacturer, not negligent
executive officers. In Champagne, it was the executive officers' insurer,
not the asbestos manufacturers, who was involved in the appeal and
affected by the court's decision. In Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, Division
of Ervin Industries, 42 the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that contributory negligence did not apply in a product liability case. Bell was
a pre-comparative fault case. It was a pre-1980 case, and the court still
refused to apply contributory negligence as a bar to recovery. In Bell,
the court said comparative fault would apply on a case by case basis,
by analogy to Louisiana Civil Code article 2323, in product liability
cases. This would seem to be true even in pre-1980 cases. The Bell
court also hinted that assumption of the risk may be unavailable as a
defense to a product manufacturer.
However, the cigarette plaintiff is not necessarily out of the woods
on this issue because the court in Cole, in a footnote stated:
As noted by the Third Circuit, contributory negligence was
available as a defense to the only defendant in this case, INA,
the liability insurer of the executive officers. Several manufacturers and suppliers remain as defendants in the companion
Champagne case. Whether contributory negligence or comparative fault is available as a defense to those defendants in the

141.
142.

Cole, 599 So. 2d at 1064 n.17.
462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).

19931

CIGARETTES & CIPOLLONE

products liability claims asserted against them is an issue not
presented or decided in the present case. See Bell v Jet Wheel
4
Blast, Division of Ervin Industries, 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985). 1
Whether the quoted language indicates a willingness to re-examine Bell
is open to question. If not, it would seem the reference to contributory
negligence is merely superfluous. As always, only time will tell.
B.

Post-LPLA Claims

The LPLA sets forth the exclusive ways in which a product may
be unreasonably dangerous. They are unreasonably dangerous in: construction or composition (mismanufacture), design, warning, or because
of the breach of an express warranty. Under its terms,'" the LPLA
sets forth the exclusive theories of recovery for a personal injury claimant. What this means is that, in Louisiana, there is no longer a general
negligence action against a manufacturer. In the cigarette context, that
means that the claim that a cigarette manufacturer is, or was, negligent
simply by producing or selling cigarettes is not cognizable. As noted
above, such a claim would not be preempted by Cipollone and, in most
states, a plaintiff could bring such a suit. However, the LPLA does
away with such claims. Moreover, the LPLA's exclusivity means that
the LPLA also takes away the plaintiff's right to recover for fraud or
for conspiracy. Recall that portions of these claims were not preempted
by Cipollone, but, because of the language of the LPLA, they are not
available in Louisiana.
Additionally, the LPLA drastically cuts back on the rights of an
injured plaintiff to recover in redhibition. Under the LPLA, redhibition
damages are limited to economic loss. 4 Thus, in a cigarette case, a
redhibition claim would now only be available to allow recovery of the
difference between the value of the cigarettes, as warranted, and their
value, as is; however, it would not be available for personal injury
damages as it was under Philippe. Attorney's fees would not be recoverable in association with the prosecution of personal injury claims.'"
So what does the act allow? The act would allow, under its construction or composition section, 47 recovery for the mismanufactured
cigarette. The deviation from other products manufactured by the same
manufacturer would have to be material'" and, presumably, it would
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have to render the product unreasonably dangerous. Again, this seems
to be a very unlikely avenue for recovery in most cases.
Under the LPLA's design sections, 49 the plaintiff has to establish
that an alternative design existed which would have prevented the plaintiff's damages. I have written elsewhere concerning what "existed" means:
whether it means existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's
control, or whether it means existed at the time of trial. 50 However,
whatever "existed" means, the plaintiff must establish an alternative
design. It seems especially difficult if the alternative design must not
adversely impact the utility, i.e., enjoyment, of the product. For instance,
one can imagine lettuce cigarettes, or nicotineless tobacco; however, even
though these may be healthier products, it would seem that they would
be much less desirable to the addicted smoker and probably infeasible.
Moreover, the plaintiff must establish proximate cause, a requirement
which was fatal to Rose Cipollone's design claims. Thus, the design
claim does not seem to be a particularly promising one, either in Louisiana or elsewhere.
The LPLA also provides for a failure to warn claim. The LPLA's
failure to warn claim does not seem to be substantially different from
national law on the subject. To the extent that a plaintiff claims that
additional language should have been used in packaging, advertising, or
promotion, the claim would be preempted under Cipollone. Of course,
the same arguments made above would also apply in Louisiana to the
extent that the plaintiff could argue that a tobacco manufacturer had
an obligation to warn outside the context of the package, promotion,
or advertising. This is, of course, assuming that such an extra package,
promotion or advertising warning is consistent with a "fair but narrow"
reading of the preemption provisions of the act. As indicated earlier,
I believe it is consistent with this "fair but narrow" reading.
Interestingly, even if such a warning claim is cognizable, the LPLA's
definition of warning is somewhat reminiscent of Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A, comment (i). The LPLA provides:
"Adequate warning" means a warning or instruction that would
lead an ordinary reasonable user or handler of a product to
contemplate the danger in using or handling the product and
either to decline to use or handle the product or, if possible,
to use or handle the product in such a manner as to avoid the
damage for which the claim is made. 5'
The words "if possible" in the last clause point out that some products
just cannot be used safely. As to those products, the manufacturer must
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still warn of the risk and give the user the knowledge to decide to
decline to use the product.
Interestingly, the LPLA provides that the manufacturer has a continuing duty not only to test its products and gather knowledge about
them, but also to warn of any dangers discovered after manufacture
(or dangers which should have been discovered).152 This section of the
LPLA essentially establishes a negligence standard for the manufacturer's
continuing duty to warn. This duty may well be applicable to cigarette
manufacturers. Should they have done more for smokers who had already
bought their products? Should they have told them to consult doctors?
Should they have warned them of the cumulative effects of smoking?
Of course such a cumulative effect warning could be given with later
purchased cigarettes. But there is a difference between warning of future
risks from cigarettes about to be smoked and the effect of this later
smoking when cumulated with earlier smoking. Under this analytic scenario, the obligation to "warn" may not only be current as to later
purchased cigarettes, but continuing as to earlier purchased cigarettes.
However, such warning claims would be preempted after 1969 unless
based upon an extra-promotional failure to warn.
The LPLA does create a claim for breach of express warranty if
the defendant manufacturer makes an express warranty concerning a
product which induces its use by the plaintiff or another.' 53 This claim
would not be preempted under the plurality opinion in Cipollone. To
recover, the plaintiff must show statements made by the manufacturer,
which rise to the level of an express warranty, and which induced the
use of the product. Federally mandated warnings may adversely affect
the plaintiff's ability to prove inducement.
What about post-LPLA secondary smoke claims in Louisiana? Assuming that warning claims, at least those concerning packaging, promotion and advertising are preempted, the only claims that a secondary
smoke plaintiff may have would be a warranty claim and an extrapromotional warning claim. It may be difficult for plaintiffs to find
express warranties regarding the safety of cigarettes, especially' in relation
to secondary smoke. This would be an area where a general negligence
claim would be particularly appropriate. A secondary smoke plaintiff
would allege that it was negligent to sell cigarettes because of the risk
which they posed to not just smokers but also secondary smokers;
however, as noted, such a claim is not available under the LPLA.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Cipollone raises more questions than it answers.
Deciding what is left after Cipollone and what is preempted will require
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a detailed analysis of the pleadings in each individual case. In Louisiana,
Cipollone, in conjunction with the LPLA, seems to signal even greater
inroads into the rights of people injured by smoking. As I indicated at
the outset, I came to explain Cipollone, not to praise it. But one notes
and even may praise the plurality's effort to reach a compromise in
their middle of the road interpretation of the cigarette labeling and
advertising acts. Only time will tell whether that compromise will turn
out to be a legal no-man's-land, where law can never really make sense.

